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Comments
Bankruptcy Judges: Article III Beckons
After a ten year study of the bankruptcy court system in the United
States,' Congress enacted reform legislation entitled the Bankruptcy

Reform Act of 19782 (hereinafter referred to as the 1978 Act), which
was designed to reflect modern societal and economic changes. 3 Con-

gress recognized that an important requirement for fair and efficient
adjudication of bankruptcy cases was that bankruptcy judges possess
broad powers to hear and adjudicate all claims arising in or related
to bankruptcy cases. 4 Witnesses at the House Subcomittee hearings
on the bankruptcy system told subcomittee members that the United

States Constitution requires bankruptcy judges to have article III status
to exercise the broad jurisdiction necessary for fair and efficient handl-

ing of bankruptcy cases.' Article III status means that a federal judge
has the protection of life tenure and a guarantee against salary
dimunition. Congress ultimately gave broad jurisdiction to bankruptcy
judges, but did not grant them article III status. 7
In 1982 the Supreme Court, in Northern Pipeline Co. v. Marathon

Pipe Line Co.,8 struck down the jurisdictional grant of the 1978 Act.9
The bankruptcy and district court judges suddenly faced a situation

1. King, The Unmaking of a Bankruptcy Court: The Aftermath of Northern Pipeline
v. Marathon, 40 WAs. & LEE L. Rnv. 99, 100 (1983).
2. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978).
3. Northern Pipeline Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 52-53 (1982).
4. King, supra note 1, at 100.
5. Id. at 101. The House Judiciary Committee and the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights gave lengthy consideration to the constitutional issues surrounding the conferral of broad powers upon the bankruptcy courts. H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977);
Hearings on H.R. 31 and H.R. 32 before the Subcommittee on Civil and ConstitutionalRights
of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 2081-84 (1976); id., at 2682-2706;
H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, 39 (1977). The Committee, the Subcommittee, and the entire House
of Representatives initially concluded that article III courts were constitutionally required for
bankruptcy adjudications. Id.
6. U.S. CONST. art. III, §1.
7. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, §241(a), 92 Stat. 2549,
2668 (1978) (amended 1984). The decision under the 1978 Act to deny article III status for
bankruptcy judges was due to a political compromise and a strong lobbying effort by the Judicial
Conference of the United States. King, supra note 1, at 101-02.
8. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
9. Id. at 87; see infra notes 48-50, 86-88 and accompanying text.
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in which bankruptcy court jurisdiction was questionable and federal
bankruptcy procedures were nonexistent.'" The Supreme Court found
that the section of the 1978 Act that granted jurisdiction to the
bankruptcy judges was not severable." A great debate ensued regarding
what power, if any, the bankruptcy judges could exert.' 2 After the
Marathon decision, an emergency rule was developed by the Judicial
Conference of the United States which allowed the bankruptcy courts
to function until Congress acted.' In 1984, Congress enacted the
Bankruptcy Amendments

and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984

(hereinafter referred to as the 1984 Act). '4 Under the 1984 Act,
bankruptcy judges again were not granted article III status.' 5 Moreover,
the grant of jurisdiction to the bankruptcy court was limited. 6 The
bankruptcy judgeships established under the 1984 Act bear the label

"judicial officers of the district court", and bankruptcy judges constitute a "unit" of the district court to be known as the bankruptcy
court. " Under the 1978 Act the bankruptcy court was an independent

10. King, supra note 1, at 115.
11. Marathon, 458 U.S. at 91-92.
12. See infra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
13. See [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) 68,908 (effective December
25, 1982). The court in Marathon, recognizing that the decision would work substantial hardship on bankruptcy litigants, held that the decision would apply prospectively and stayed the
effect of the decision until October 4, 1982, to give Congress the time to enact remedial legislation. Marathon, 458 U.S. at 88. When Congress failed to meet the October deadline, the Court
once again stayed the judgment until December 24, 1982. Id. Meanwhile, anticipating that Congress might fail to act during the stay period, the Judicial Conference distributed a proposed
rule to all bankruptcy, district, and appeals court judges. Judicial Conference Resolution (Sept.
23, 1982); see White Motor Corp. v. Citibank, N.A., 704 F.2d 254, 256 (6th Cir. 1983). Each
circuit council ordered the district courts to adopt the rule. Id. When the Supreme Court refused
to grant another stay, the proposed emergency rule went into effect in each of the 11 judicial
circuits. Administrative Order No. 28 (effective December 25, 1982).
14. Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984). The Emergency Rule and the 1984 Act have
many similar provisions. Compare id. with [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH)
68,908 (effective December 25, 1982). Many commentators questioned the constitutionality
of the Emergency Rule and one found that the rule "only has two flaws: it is invalid (illegal)
and, it is unworkable." King, supra note 1, at 116; In re South Portland Shipyard & Marine
Rys., 10 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 1012, 1016-17 (Bankr. D. Me. 1983); In re Seven Springs Apartments, 10 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 634, 655-64 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1983); Countryman, Emergency Rule
Compounds Emergency, 57 Bankr. L.J. 1, 9-12 (1983). But see White Motor Corp. v. Citibank,
N.A., 704 F.2d 254, 263-64 (6th Cir. 1983) (upholding validity of Emergency Rule); Moody
v. Martin, 27 Bankr. Rep. 991, 1000 (W.D. Wis. 1983) (rule conforms to the Marathon standards). The Supreme Court has not passed on the validity of the Emergency Rule. See, e.g.,
American Airlines Inc. v. Braniff Airways, Inc., 700 F.2d 214, 215 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 2122 (1983); In re Int'l Harvester Co., No. 82-1385, slip op. (N.D. I1l.), inand. denied,
103 S. Ct. 1804 (1983).
15. 28 U.S.C. §§151-53 (bankruptcy judges serve 14 year terms and are subject to salary
reduction).
16. Mayne, Jurisdictionand Appointment Issues Cloud Future of Bankruptcy Act of 1984,
10 Litigation News 5 (1985).
17. 28 U.S.C. §151.
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federal court with broad jurisdictional powers."8 The constitutionality
of the 1984 Act has been questioned by commentators as well as by
members of Congress.' 9 Many of these questions will be addressed
in the following sections.
The author of this comment will demonstrate the importance of
an independent federal judiciary to the doctrine of separation of
powers.2" That independence only can be maintained by establishing
federal judgeships that include the protections of salary guarantees and
life tenure granted by article III of the United States Constitution.'
After establishing the importance of an independent judiciary, this
author will review the judicial structure of the bankruptcy system under
the 1984 Act and characterize the bankruptcy court as a dependent
unit of the federal district court rather than an independent legislative
court.2 2 Independent legislative courts sometimes are referred to as

article I courts because the presiding judges do not have article III
protections. A discussion of the constitutional requirement that the
"judicial power of the United States" must vest in an article III court
will follow.2 3 This author will focus specifically on the vesting of the
judicial power under the 1984 Act. 24 An analysis of the jurisdictional
grant and procedures of the 1984 Act will reveal three constitutional
concerns. The first is whether any federal court has jurisdiction over
a state law claim related to a bankruptcy case.2 The second is whether
a possibility exists, under the 1984 Act, for a claim based entirely
upon state common law to be finally adjudicated by an article I bankruptcy judge, which is a clear violation of Marathon.26 Finally, the constitutionality of the consensual reference provision of the 1984 Act
will be explored. 2 7 This author will conclude that even if the 1984
Act is constitutional, the Act does not meet the goals Congress sought
to attain for the bankruptcy system, namely, fair and efficient adjudication of bankruptcy matters. These goals may be attained by
granting bankruptcy judges article III status. Before any solution can
be offered, however, the relationship between article III protections

18. Under the 1978 Act, bankruptcy courts were allowed to exercise "all the jurisdiction
conferred by this section to the district courts." Pub. L. 95-598, §241(a), 92 Stat. 2549, 2668.
19. Mayne, supra note 16, at 5 (1985); McCormick, 9 Litigation News 1 (1984).
20. See infra notes 28-41 and accompanying text.
21. Id.
22. See infra notes 42-75 and accompanying text.

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

See
See
See
See
See

infra
infra
infra
infra
infra

notes
notes
notes
notes
notes

75-86 and accompanying text.
87-195 and accompanying text.
131-41 and accompianying text.
142-58 and accompanying text.
159-95 and accompanying text.
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for federal judges and the importance of an independent federal
judiciary must be analyzed.
Tim STRUCTURAL IMPORTANCE OF AN INDEPENDENT FEDERAL
JUDICIARY

An independent federal judiciary represents a critical component
of the doctrine of separation of powers. 8 The framers of the United
States Constitution did not establish clear lines separating the branches
of government. Instead, they provided three independent governmen-

tal bodies to prevent the accumulation of tyrannical power in any
one branch through a system of checks and balances. "9 An independent
federal judiciary was considered necessary to ensure that the power
to make law was severed from the ability to apply the enacted law.30
Article III of the Constitution incorporates the independent federal
judiciary into the fundamental principles of American government.'
The provisions for life tenure and salary guarantees were incorporated

into article III to ensure the independence of the judiciary from control by the executive and legislative branches.32 Insulation of the
judiciary from domination by the executive and legislative branches
results in judicial impartiality. 3 Life tenure and the prohibition on
salary dimunition are integral to this insulation.34
In addition to the general advantage of impartial adjudication, more
specific purposes are served by judicial independence. To protect ade-

quately the rights of individuals from infringement by the government, judges must be free from the political influence of the executive

28.

J. NOWAK, R.

ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 136 (2d ed. 1983).
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 121 (1976)(per curiam); J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA &
J. YOUNG, CONSTrTUTONAL LAW 136 (2d ed. 1983).
30. Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764, 2790 (1983) (Powell,
J., concurring). The separation of powers doctrine reflects "the framer's concern that trial
by legislature lacks the safeguards necessary to prevent the abuse of power." Id.
31. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 135-37 (2d ed. 1983);

29.

L.

TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

15-19, 49-50 (1978).

32. Marathon, 458 U.S. at 59; U.S. CoNsT. art. III, §1. "The Judges, both of the supreme
and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behavior, and shall, at stated Times,
receive for their Services a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuation in Office." Id.
33. See The Federalist No. 78, at 490 (A. Hamilton) (Wright ed. 1961) (security of tenure
designed to "secure a steady, upright, and impartial administration of the laws"); see also
Marathon, 459 U.S. at 58.
34. The life tenure provision dates back at least as far as the Act of Settlement in 1701.
United States v. Will, 449 U.S. °200, 218 (1980). Discussing the salary guarantee in article III,
the Court said: "The compensation clause has its roots in the long standing Anglo-American
tradition of an independent judiciary." Id. at 217. "The power over a man's subsistence amounts
to a power over his will." The Federalist No. 79, at 497 (A. Hamilton) (Wright ed. 1961).
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and legislative branches.3 5 Equally important is the fact that an independent federal judiciary preserves the balance of power between
the national government and the states. 6 The principles of federalism
are advanced by an independent federal judiciary that can balance
federal interests and policies against legitimate operations of state
judicial systems to ensure that encroachment on the sovereignty of
the states is avoided.3 7 Furthermore, life tenure and salary guarantees
promote the integrity of the federal judiciary as an institution and
facilitate accurate decision making." Finally, the tenure and salary
requirements of article III attract highly qualified persons to the bench
and enhance public confidence in the federal courts,3 9
Life tenure and salary guarantees are integral to the preservation
of judicial independence, a critical aspect of the doctrine of separation of powers."0 These article III provisions are accorded great
deference by the Supreme Court.4 If the constitutional policies of
judicial independence and separation of powers are violated by Congressional action creating nonarticle III bankruptcy judges, that Congressional action is unconstitutional. The following sections examining
recent Congressional action regarding bankruptcy laws will help determine whether important constitutional policies are violated.
LEGISLATIVE CouRTs: SORTING OUT THE CoNFUsIoN

In 1828, Chief Justice Marshall introduced the concept of legislative
courts in American Insurance Co. v. Canter."2 The Chief Justice
recognized that Congressional power, stemming from article I, permits
the establishment of tribunals. "3 Following American Insurance Co.,
the labyrinth of Court decisions relating to legislative courts
demonstrates that a continuing confusion exists regarding the extent

35. See The Federalist No. 78, at 494 (A. Hamilton) (Wright ed. 1961). "The independence
" Id.;
of judges is equally requisite to guard the Constitution and the rights of individuals ..
see also Note, Article III Limits on Article I Courts: The Constitutionalityof the Bankruptcy
Court and the 1979 MagistrateAct, 80 COLUM. L. Rav. 560, 582 (1980) (freeing judges from
political influence protects individual rights).
36. Note, supra note 35, at 582-83.
37. The Federalist No. 78, at 494 (A. Hamilton) (Wright ed. 1961) (federal courts are the
"bulwarks of a limited Constitution against legislative encroachments" on both rights reserved
to states and individuals' rights); Note, supra note 35, at 583.
38. Note, supra note 35, at 583.
39. Id.at 583-85.

40.

See supra notes 28-39 and accompanying text.

41.

See generally Marathon, 458 U.S. at 57-62 (discussing importance of article III

protections).
42.

26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 546 (1828).

43.

Id.
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of Congressional power to create legislative courts. 4 The decisions

of the Supreme Court of the United States reflect the position that
the Constitution gives Congress the power to establish federal courts
with judges who do not possess article III protections.45 The Supreme
Court addressed the constitutional issues raised by Congressional creation of legislative courts in Marathon."
The confusion surrounding legislative courts was not eliminated by
the Marathon opinion. Marathon consisted of a plurality opinion written by Justice Brennan and joined by three justices,47 a concurrence
by Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice O'Connor, and two dissenting
opinions." The opinions demonstrate the disagreement among the present justices regarding the limits of Congressional power to create
legislative courts. A majority of the justices held that section 241(a)
of the 1978 Act, providing for the jurisdiction and procedure of the
bankruptcy system, violated article III of the Constitution, 9 at least
to the extent that the grant of jurisdiction in the 1978 Act permitted
bankruptcy judges to rule on claims based entirely upon state law. 0
A majority of justices, however, could not agree on what constitutes
a valid legislative court.
In his plurality opinion, Justice Brennan distinguished three traditional areas for which Congress could establish tribunals under article
I, notwithstanding article III."' The three traditionally recognized
legislative courts, according to the plurality, are territorial courts, 2
military courts-martial, 3 and courts established to resolve issues of
public rights. 4 The Marathon plurality held that the bankruptcy court,

44. See generally Comment, Limits on Legislative Court Judicial Power: The Need For
Balancing Competing Interests, 59 Cm. KENT L. REv. 873 (1983) (overview of confusion in
case law prior to and including Marathon).
45. See American Insurance v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet). 511, 546 (1828) (territorial courts
established as legislative courts). The Supreme Court has found article I courts valid under
the necessary and proper clause. See Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 382-83 (1977); Palmore
v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 410 (1973); Glidden v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 543-44 (1962);
Ex Parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 449 (1929).
46. Marathon, 458 U.S. at 61-76, 89-100.
47. Justice Brennan's opinion was joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens.
Id. at 52.
48. Chief Justice Burger filed a dissenting opinion. Id. Justice White filed a dissenting
opinion also, which was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell. Id.
49. Id. at 87.
50. Id. at 91 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
51. Id. at 63-70.
52. Id. at 64-65.
53. Id. at 66.
54. Id. at 67-70. The plurality recognized that for the present case public rights must arise
between the government and an individual, and that private rights matters arise between one

individual and another. Id.
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as established by the 1978 Act, did not fall within one of the traditional
areas and, therefore, Congress did not have the power under article
I to establish bankruptcy courts with the broad jurisdictional powers
granted under the 1978 Act. 5 In his concurrence, Justice Rehnquist
did not adopt the plurality view limiting article I courts to the three
traditional areas. 56 Justice Rehnquist stated that the legislative court
issue need not be decided, since the case should be decided on another
ground, namely, that the critical claim in Marathon arose entirely
under state law and adjudication of that state law claim by the
7
bankruptcy court would violate article III of the Constitution.
Justice White, dissenting, found no way to distinguish article III
and article I courts on the basis of the work performed by each court.51
He labeled the statement that article III courts are those in which
article III judges sit and article I courts those without article III judges
a "simple tautology." 9 In conclusion, Justice White stated that a
balance must be struck between competing constitutional values and
legislative responsibilities. 6" With respect to the 1978 Act, Justice White
believed that the legislative interests outweighed the constitutional
values. 6' The divergent views regarding legislative courts must be considered in characterizing the judicial structure created under the 1984
Act regarding bankruptcy judges to determine whether the jurisdictional provisions of the new act violate article III. The 1984 Act will
be examined in light of the divergent opinions expressed in Marathon.
This author will conclude that Congress has avoided the legislative
court confusion by creating a bankruptcy court unit within the existing structure of the district court system.
Under the 1984 Act, bankruptcy judges are designated as "judicial
officers of the district court.''62 These judges do not have article III
status. 63 Although the bankruptcy judges can be labeled article I judges
because they lack article III status, Congress has not created an independent legislative court; rather, Congress has established "units" of
existing district courts. 64 The significance of characterizing bankruptcy
55. Id. at 71.
56. Id. at 91.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 113.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. 28 U.S.C. §151.
63. The new bankruptcy judges do not enjoy life tenure but are appointed to 14 year
terms. 28 U.S.C. §152(a)(1). The salary of the new bankruptcy judges is determined under
section 225 of the Federal Salary Act of 1967. Id. §153.
64. Id. §151.
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courts as units of the existing district courts is apparent if contrasted
with the label Congress attached to bankruptcy courts under the 1978
Act: "The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District."' 6 The
legislative history of the 1984 Act is devoid of any reason for the
altered description of bankruptcy courts, but in light of Marathon,
the change indicates a desire by Congress to limit the jurisdictional
grant to the new bankruptcy courts." Accordingly, Congress significantly inGreased the control district courts may exert over bankruptcy
judges.67 The domination by the district court over the bankruptcy
judges bolsters the argument that bankruptcy judges do not have final
decision making authority, but rather, that authority remains with
the district court. Enactment of the 1984 Act indicates an attempt
by Congress to avoid the confusion" associated with the creation of
an independent legislative court 69 by establishing article I judges who
sit as judicial officers in existing article III district courts.
Bankruptcy judges now resemble United States Magistrates established under the Federal Magistrates Act of 1979.70 U.S. Magistrates
also are officers of the district court, and the magistrate system in
the federal district court has been held constitutional in two appellate
court decisions. 7' The similarity between the bankruptcy system and
the magistrate system may indicate a trend by Congress to avoid the
challenge that independent legislative courts are being created.
The designation of the new bankruptcy system as units of the district
court rather than independent legislative courts is significant because
many of the troublesome issues that the Marathon Court labored over
regarding legislative courts are eliminated. 7" Although Congress may
have avoided the issue regarding whether or not a new legislative court

65. Compare id. with Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978). The Marathon plurality
found that Congress did not attempt to create a legislative court by enacting the 1978 Act.
Marathon, 458 U.S. at 63.
66. Lavien, Highlights of the Bankruptcy Amendments and FederalJudgeship Act of 1984,
West Publishing Co., Bankruptcy Code, Rules and Forms, at VII (1984).
67. Bankruptcy judges, who hear only matters referred to them by district courts, are appointed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the circuit, and may be removed under the proper

circumstances by the judicial council for the circuit. 28 U.S.C. §157(a),(e). This district court

has the power to withdraw a referred case. Id. §157(d). The district court also has appellate
jurisdiction over final judgments, orders, and decrees of the bankruptcy judges. Id. §158(a).
68. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
69. See supra notes 41-67 and accompanying text.

70. Compare 28 U.S.C. §§151-58 with id. §§631-39 (1982) (control by district court and
referral provisions are similar).
71.

Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic, Inc. v. Instromedix, Inc., 725 F.2d 537, 547 (9th Cir.

1984) (en banc); Wharton-Thomas v. United States, 721 F.2d 922, 929-30 (3d Cir. 1983).

72. The first argument presented by the appellant, Marathon Pipe Line Co., was that Congress had created a valid, independent legislative court. Marathon, 458 U.S. at 63.

1985 / Bankruptcy Judges

has been created, other constitutional issues remain unresolved." The
discussion of the constitutional issues will begin with a review of the
requirement for vesting of the judicial power of the United States
in an article III court. The Marathon Court, to some extent, was able
to agree upon the court in which the "Judicial Power of the United

States" must vest.74

VESTING THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE UNITED STATES IN AN

ARTICLE III COURT

A discussion of vesting requirements for federal judicial power
logically must begin with the United States Constitution. Article III
of the United States Constitution requires that "[tihe judicial power
of the United States be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such75
inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time establish."
In the plurality opinion in Marathon, Justice Brennan addressed this
portion of article III in relation to the 1978 Act. 76 He concluded that
while Congress possessed the authority to assign certain fact finding
functions to fact finding tribunals, the power to adjudicate the private
rights of litigants must vest in an article III court.77 Citing Crowell
v.Benson," Justice Brennan stated that Congressional power to create
fact finding tribunals is not an exception to article III, but is consistent
with article III provided "the essential attributes of the judicial power"
remain vested in an article III court. 79 The term "essential attributes"
was not defined by Justice Brennan. An analysis of Supreme Court
decisions reveals no express definition, but the retention of procedural
control and final decision making authority by the district court has
been identified as significant for an understanding of essential
attributes.8"
The Supreme Court has sustained the use of adjunct fact finders
in the adjudication of both congressionally created rights8 ' and constitutionally created rights,8 2 but only if sufficient control was maintained by an article III court.8 3 Sufficient control includes the retention
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
58 ST.
81.
82.
83.

See infra notes 131-95 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 75-86 and accompanying text.
U.S. CONsT. art. III, §1.
Marathon, 458 U.S. at 77.
Id.
285 U.S. 22 (1932).
Id. at 51; Marathon, 458 U.S. at 77.
Note, Magistrate Trials: The New Hierarchy of Class 2 Adjuncts and Article III Judges,
JoHN's L. REv. 559, 569-72 (1984)(explanation of essential attributes).
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50 (1932).
United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 682-83 (1980).
Marathon, 458 U.S. at 78-83. Justice Brennan observed that the Court'upheld the
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of final decision making authority by the article III court.84 Analogizing
to bankruptcy courts, Justice Brennan may have meant that in order
to retain the "essential attributes" of judicial power, the article III
court must exert great control over the adjunct courts and retain the
final decision making authority.8" A reconciliation between Justice
Brennan's plurality opinion and Justice Rehnquist's concurrence may
be possible.
Justice Rehnquist limited his concurrence because of the historical
restraint by the Supreme Court to avoid constitutional questions if
the claim may be adjudicated on alternative grounds.16 Both dissenting
opinions contended that the Marathon holding was limited to Justice
Rehnquist's concurrence.8 7 The holding that emerges, limited by the
Rehnquist concurrence, is that a state law cause of action, if heard
at all within the federal court system, must be heard by an article
III court.8 8 Moreover, if federal court adjudication of a state law cause
of action is labeled a portion of "the judicial power of the United
States," the holding of Marathon must stand for the proposition that
the judicial power must vest in an article III court and necessarily
must be heard by an article III judge. This holding is significant in
evaluating where the judicial power has been vested by Congress in
the 1984 Act. Following an overview of the vesting of the judicial
power under the 1984 Act, constitutional issues specifically relating
to the requirements of article III will be raised.
CONSTITUTIONAL RAMIFICATIONS OF THE BANKRUPTCY AMENDMENTS
AND FEDERAL JUDGESHIP ACT OF

1984

Since the Marathon ruling in 1982, Congress expended great effort
to reach a compromise culminating in the new bankruptcy
1978 Federal Magistrates Act, which also permitted referral of certain functions to adjunct
magistrates, because the ultimate decision making authority remained with the district court
judge. Id.
84. Id. at 79. Justice Brennan considered prior Supreme Court decisions and concluded
that the ultimate decision making authority in the magistrate context included reference and
withdrawal provisions, and that magistrates were appointed, and subject to removal by the
district court. Id.
85. See supra notes 76-84 and accompanying text.
86. Marathon, 458 U.S. at 90. Justice Rehnquist found that cases raising issues relating
to powers of article III courts and the confusion surrounding those issues particularly are suitable
for adherence to the principle of judicial restraint. Id. See United States v. Raines, 362 U.S.
17, 21 (1960) (rules regarding judicial restraint in the area of constitutional issues).
87. See Marathon, 458 U.S. at 92 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); see also id. at 94 (White,
J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 90-91; see id. at 92 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); see also The Analysis of Proposed
Amendments to The Bankruptcy Act of 1978, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Naws
601, 603. The court found the jurisdictional provisions of the 1978 Act nonseverable and declared
all of section 241(a) unconstitutional. Marathon, 458 U.S. at 91-92.
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amendments. 89 Many concerns were raised by members of Congress
regarding the constitutionality of the grant of jurisdiction under the
1984 Act. 90 Since enactment of the 1984 Act, further constitutional
questions have been raised by commentators. 9 A thorough review
of the pertinent provisions of the 1984 Act is nessessary to facilitate
the analysis of the constitutional ramifications. Initially, the jurisdictional grant will be examined, including the important abstention
provisions.9 2 Next, consideration will be given to the procedural requirements under the 1984 Act. 93 Finally, the constitutional ramifications
of the 1984 Act will be analyzed in detail.
A.

Jurisdiction

Under the 1984 Act, the grant of jurisdiction over bankruptcy matters is given to the district courts in 28 U.S.C. section 1334. This section
replaces 28 U.S.C. section 1471, which was the jurisdictional grant under
the 1978 Act found overly broad and unconstitutional in Marathon.94
For purposes of this comment, bankruptcy cases can be analyzed as
falling into two groups. The first group includes all cases under Title
11 or proceedings arising in a case under Title 11. 91 Included therein
are most of those proceedings unique to bankruptcy actions, commonly
known as core proceedings. 96 Generally, these proceedings are governed
by federal bankruptcy law, which are laws of the United States, and
have their constitutional basis in article III, section 2. 97 The second
group of bankruptcy cases includes civil proceedings arising in or
related to cases under Title 11.98 This group of claims is much more
difficult to delimitate. Although Title 11 does not provide a defini89. 1984 U.S. CODE
tive July 10, 1984).

CONG.

& AD. NEWS 584; see Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (effec-

90. Id. at 584-85; see id. at 591. 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 584, 585.
91.

Mayne, supra note 16, at 5.

92. See 28 U.S.C. §1334(c)(1) (permissive abstention); see also id. §1334(c)(2) (mandatory
abstention).
93. See id. §157.
94. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
95. 28 U.S.C. §1334(a)-(b).
96. Core proceedings include, but are not limited to:
(A) matters concerning the administration of the estate.
(C) counterclaims by the estate against persons filing claims against the estate.
(0) other proceedings affecting the liquidation of the assets of the estate or the adjustment of the debtor-creditor or the equity security holder relationship, except personal
injury tort or wrongful death claims.
Id. §157(a)(2).
97. U.S. CoNsT. art. III, §2, cl. 1.
98. 28 U.S.C. §1334(b).
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tion, the emergency interim rule instituted in federal district courts
after Marathon included an attempt to define related proceedings.99
The state law claim in Marathon was found to be a related claim
to the bankruptcy case.' ° If no diversity of citizenship exists, the constitutional basis for federal jurisdiction over independent, related claims
must be found either under the pre-1978 Act "summary" jurisdiction theory'0 ' or the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction. Prior to the
enactment of the 1978 Act, "summary" jurisdiction existed in bankruptcy courts over matters involving the estate subject to the bankruptcy proceeding and third persons under two scenarios.' 2 First, the bankruptcy court had subject matter jurisdiction if the res"° involved in
the proceeding was in the actual or constructive possession of the
court. 0 4 Second, summary jurisdiction existed if a third party with
a claim against the bankrupt estate expressly or impliedly consented
to bankruptcy court jurisdiction.' To exercise pendent jurisdiction,
the related claim must have a common nucleus of facts with the federal
bankruptcy claim. 0 6 Under the 1984 Act, the district court has original
and exclusive jurisdiction of all cases under Title 11,107 and original,
but not exclusive, jurisdiction of all claims arising in or related to
cases under Title 11.108 Once subject matter jurisdiction is established
in the district court, that court must determine whether the abstention provisions apply.
The 1984 Act provides both permissive and "mandatory"
abstention. 09 In the interest of justice, or in the interest of comity
or respect for state law, a district court may abstain from hearing
a particular proceeding arising under Title 11 or arising in or related
99. See supra note 13.
100. Marathon, 458 U.S. at 90 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). No federal rule is provided
for the claims held by Northern that arise entirely under state law. Id. The claim is only in
the federal court system because Northern filed for reorganization. Id.
101. See WmtE, BANKRUPTCY AND CREDITORS RIGHTS 36-37 (1985) (review of summary
jurisdiction); see Tamasha Town & Country Club v. McAlester Const. Fin. Corp., 252 F. Supp.

80, 85 (S.D. Cal. 1966) (explanation of summary jurisdiction). The constitutional basis for summary jurisdiction was not expressed explicitly by the Supreme Court although the basis may
exist under Congress' constitutional authority over bankruptcies in article I. See Schumaker
v. Beeler, 293 U.S. 367, 374 (1934). The Marathon plurality found that Congress had eliminated

summary jurisdiction by enacting the 1978 Act. Marathon, 458 U.S. at 54.
102. Tamasha, 252 F. Supp. at 85.
103. Res includes property that is in the possession of the debtor at the time the bankruptcy
was filed. WmmE, supra note 101, at 37.
104. Id. at 36-37.
105. King, supra note 1, at 100 n. 11.
106. United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
107. 28 U.S.C. §1334(a).
108. Id. §1334(b).
109. Id. §1334(c); See Wmn, supra note 101, at 60-62. Some question remains regarding
whether "mandatory" abstention is truly mandatory. See infra notes 111-15 and accompanying

text.
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to a case under Title 11." To trigger the mandatory abstention provision the proceeding must be based on a state law claim related to
a case under Title 11.1" In addition, the claim must be an action
that, standing alone, could not have been commenced in a federal
court."' If the claim is one that prompts mandatory abstention, the
district court must abstain only if: (1) a timely motion is made; (2)
an action is commenced in a proper state court; and (3) state court
adjudication of the claim can be made in a timely manner." 3 The
abstention procedure can be described as follows: unless these three
statutory requirements are satisfied, subject matter jurisdiction is conferred upon the district court." 4 Since the district court has some discretion in determining whether or not the third requirement' is met, the
court, in essence, has discretion to claim subject matter jurisdiction
over a related state law claim. If federal court adjudication of a state
law claim that could not otherwise have been brought in a federal
court is permitted, the district court has powers beyond the scope
of article 111."5 This conclusion necessarily follows from the constitutional requirements of article III limiting federal court jurisdiction." 6
Due to the fact that the 1984 Act has only recently gone into effect,
certain procedural aspects will need further analysis as courts begin
to interpret the new Act.' '7 This author will review pertinent bankruptcy procedures based upon past court decisions addressing prior
bankruptcy law.
B.

Procedures Under the 1984 Act

The 1984 Act provides new procedures for bankruptcy actions." '
Initially, the district court may refer to the bankruptcy judges all
110. 28 U.S.C. §1334(c)(1); see Lundin, The 1984 Bankruptcy Amendments; Holes in the
Matrb, Norton Bankr. Law Advisor 1, 1-4 (1984) (explanation and chart of bankruptcy claims).
111
28 U.S.C. §1334(c)(2).
112. Mandatory abstention is designed to allow federal courts to adjudicate state law claims
"that could not otherwise have been brought in federal court." See The Analysis of Proposed
Amendments to The Bankruptcy Act of 1978, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CoNo. & AD. NEws
601, 603.
113. 28 U.S.C. §1334(c)(2).
114. See id.
115. See The Analysis of Proposed Amendments to the Bankruptcy Act of 1978, reprinted
in 1984 U.S. CODE CoNo. & AD. NEws 601.
116. See U.S. CONsT. art. III, cl. 2 (jurisdiction only over cases arising under the laws
of the United States).

117.

See e.g.,
Inre S.E. Hornsby & Sons Sand and Gravel Co., 12 Bankr. Court Deci-

sions, at A2 (Feb. 21, 1985) (abstention from turnover proceeding not proper); In re Larry Austin
Criswell, 12 Bankr. Court Decisions, at A2 (Feb. 7, 1985) (claim for punitive damages held
to be a core proceeding).
118. See 28 U.S.C. §157 (procedures).
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bankruptcy matters, including related claims." 9 District courts have
adopted rules for automatic referral due to their propensity towards
avoidance of bankruptcy matters.' 20 Upon referral, a bankruptcy judge
will determine whether a proceeding is core or non-core.' 2' While core
proceedings are enumerated under section 157(b)(2), no definition is
given for non-core proceedings. Arguably, a non-core proceeding is
a proceeding that is otherwise related to a case under Title 11 since
section 157(b)(3) distinguishes between otherwise related proceedings
and core proceedings. The 1984 Act further provides that personal
injury tort and wrongful death claims must be tried in the district
court.' 22 If these claims are severed from other bankruptcy proceedings,
piecemeal litigation will result. If a bankruptcy judge determines that
a proceeding is a core proceeding as defined in section 157(b)(2), the
matter will be heard and determined by the bankruptcy judge.' 23 If

a determination is made that the matter is a non-core proceeding,
the actions of the bankruptcy judge will be guided by whether all

the parties to the action consent.' 24 Based upon the consent of all
parties, a bankruptcy judge may hear, determine, and enter appropriate
orders and judgments with respect to the related, non-core
proceeding.' 21 If the parties do not consent, a bankruptcy judge only
may hear the related claim and submit proposed findings of fact and
conclusions of law to the district court.' 26 After de novo review, the
district court will issue appropriate final orders and judgments. 2 7
The district court retains the power to withdraw a referred case
or proceeding from the bankruptcy court.' 28 Withdralwal is mandatory
if the district court determines that the resolution of the proceeding
requires consideration of both Title 11 and other laws of the United
States regulating organizations or activities affecting interstate
commerce.' 29 Otherwise, withdrawal is permissive. 3 ' The 1984 Act
provides that the district courts have jurisdiction over appeals from
final judgments, orders,.and decrees of bankruptcy judges.' 3' Viewed
119.
120.
1984, 8
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id. §157(a).
Thomas, Highlights of the Bankruptcy Amendments and FederalJudgeship Act of
Bus. LAW NEws 3, 4 (1984).
28 U.S.C. §157(b)(3).
Id. §157(b)(5).
Id. §157(b)(1).
Id. §157(c)(2).
Id.
Id. §157(c)(1).
Id.
Id. §157(d).

Id.
Id.
Id. § 158(a).
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in light of the Marathon holding, the procedural requirements of the
1984 Act raise various constitutional questions.
Three possible constitutional concerns must be examined. A preliminary issue relating to the application of the 1984 Act is whether
the district court has subject matter jurisdiction over a state law claim
related to a bankruptcy proceeding.132 If no federal court can adjudicate a state law claim related to a bankruptcy proceeding, the
33
case for article III status for bankruptcy judges will not be as strong.'
A second issue is whether a bankruptcy judge, under the 1984 Act,
may adjudicate a state law claim without the consent of the parties.
Finally, the 1984 Act and related court decisions must be examined
to determine whether an article I bankruptcy judge may hear and
determine a Marathon claim with the consent of the parties and
3
whether consent is sufficient to overcome article III concerns. 1
C. Constitutional Issues Raised by the 1984 Act
1. Constitutional Basis for Jurisdiction in Federal Courts
The first constitutional concern raised in this comment is whether
a federal district court has subject matter jurisdiction over a state
law claim related to a bankruptcy case. This threshold issue is significant because if no federal court can exercise jurisdiction over state
law claims related to a case under Title 11, article III status for
bankruptcy judges may not provide a desirable solution for creating
a fair and efficient bankruptcy system. Since an article I bankruptcy
judge, as an officer of the district court, might have sufficient power
under the Constitution to adjudicate claims other than Marathon type
35
state-based claims, article III status would be unnecessary.
In examining Marathon, what was decided by the Court must be
distinguished from what was not decided. A majority of justices
decided in Marathon that a nonarticle III judge could not adjudicate
a state law claim under the 1978 Act.' 36 The Marathon Court did
not hold that a district court could hear the claim;' 37 therefore, the
132.

See The Analysis of Proposed Amendments to The Bankruptcy Act
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 601, 603.
133. See infra note 193 and accompanying text.
134. The basis for upholding the Federal Magistrates Act of 1979 was
the action consent to adjudication by article I magistrates. Pacemaker Diagnostic
Inc. v. Instromedix, Inc., 725 F.2d 537, 542-57 (9th Cir. 1984).
135. A narrow reading of Marathonresults in the conclusion that article
claims other than state law claims. See Marathon, 458 U.S. at 90-91.
136. See supra notes 48-50, 86-88 and accompanying text.
137. See The Analysis of Proposed Amendments to The Bankruptcy Act
in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 601, 602.

of 1978, reprinted

in 1984 U.S.

that all parties to
Clinic of America,
I judges may hear
of 1978, reprinted
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district court must find a constitutional source of authority for subject matter jurisdiction.' If the parties are not of diverse citizenship
and a related claim arises that is based entirely upon state law, and,
therefore, is not a federal question, two possible constitutional bases
for jurisdiction exist. First, a district court may have a constitutional
basis for jurisdiction over state law claims if the court recognizes summary jurisdiction.' 39 A second justification might exist if the district
court chooses to exercise pendent jurisdiction.'10
Whether the district courts will extend the old doctrine of summary jurisdiction used prior to the 1978 Act to justify their jurisdiction over state law claims related to a bankruptcy action must await
future federal court decisions.' Pendent jurisdiction, on the other
hand, would not apply unless a successful argument is advanced in
favor of extending the doctrine. The proponent of an argument for
extending pendent jurisdiction might assert that the claims held by
the debtor in a bankruptcy action are assets or property owned by
the bankrupt estate.' 42 The district court may find that all property
owned by the bankrupt estate has a common nucleus of fact to the
bankruptcy case." ' The justification for the application of pendent
44
jurisdiction is judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to litigants.'
While the federal courts have broadened the application of pendent
jurisdiction since 1966, ' the federal claim and the related state claim
still must comprise one "case" to find a constitutional basis for district
court jurisdiction under article 111.146 Unless the doctrine of pendent
jurisdiction is extended to cover related state law claims, the article
III court, whether a district court or a bankruptcy court granted article III status, would have to rely on the doctrine of summary jurisdiction for the constitutional justification for federal jurisdiction over
the related state law claim. The federal court must assert some con138.

Owen Equipment and Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 372 (1978). "Constitu-

tional power is merely the first hurdle that must be overcome in determining that a federal
court has jurisdiction over a particular controversy. For the jurisdiction of the federal courts
is limited not only by the provisions of Art. III of the Constitution, but also by Acts of Congress." Id.
139. See supra notes 101-07 and accompanying text.
140. See The Analysis of Proposed Amendments to The Bankruptcy Act of 1978, reprinted
in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 601, 603.
141. See supra notes 101-07 and accompanying text.
142. Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 329-30 (1965).
143. 28 U.S.C. §504.

144. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966); see Shakman, The New
Pendent Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 20 STAN. L. REv. 262, 265-68 (1968) (criticizing
the justifications).
145.
146.

United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
Shakman, supra note 144, at 265.
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stitutional basis for subject matter jurisdiction. 47 Once a constitutional basis for subject matter jurisdiction is established, the initial
constitutional issue is resolved and the second issue relating to the constitutionality of bankruptcy procedures must be examined.
2.

State Law Claims as Core Matters

Under the 1984 Act, if a state law claim or cause of action is determined by a bankruptcy judge to be a core proceeding, the claim could
be heard and determined by an article I bankruptcy judge without
the consent of the parties. 148 If the 1984 Act allows an article I
bankruptcy judge to adjudicate a state law claim without the consent
of the parties, the 1984 Act may violate Marathon. 49 This author
will attempt to determine whether the 1984 Act permits an article I
judge to hear and decide a claim based entirely upon state common
law in the following two examples. 5 '
The first example arises under section 157(b)(2)(C) of the 1984 Act,
which provides that counterclaims held by the estate against adverse
claimants are core proceedings.' 5' Under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, a counterclaim is compulsory if "it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's
claim. . . ,,'52 If a bankrupt estate has a state law based counterclaim
that is compulsory under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, this
claim would be designated a core proceeding '5 and heard and determined by an article I bankruptcy judge 51 without the consent of the
parties; 5 5 a violation of Marathon. 56 Although an argument can be
made that the bankrupt party impliedly consented to the jurisdiction
of the bankruptcy court by petitioning for bankruptcy, no implied
jurisdiction exists in the case of an involuntary bankruptcy.,5 7 Thus,
the rationale that a litigant consents to jurisdiction over counterclaims
by filing an action against the counterclaimant does not apply.
147. U.S. CONST. art. III, §2.
148. 28 U.S.C. §157(b)(1).
149. See Marathon, 458 U.S. at 90-91.
150. The two hypothetheticals are advanced because of the absence of case law regarding
the 1984 Act. Recent bankruptcy and district court decisions have addressed the 1984 Act.
See infra note 202.
151. 28 U.S.C. §157(b)(2)(C).
152. FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a).
153. 28 U.S.C. §157(b)(2)(C).
154. Id. §157(b)(3).

155.

Id. §157(b)(1).

156. Marathon, 458 U.S. at 91.
157. See 11 U.S.C. §301 (voluntary cases commenced by the debtor); see also 11 U.S.C.
§303 (involuntary cases commenced by holders of claims against debtor).

Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 16

Another example of a possible Marathon violation might arise under
section 157(b)(2)(O) if an outstanding contract claim based upon state
law was found to affect the liquidation of assets of the estate. Under
section 157(b)(2)(O), a core proceeding includes proceedings affecting
the liquidation of assets of the estate or adjustment of the debtorcreditor relationship.' s An exception exists for personal injury tort
or wrongful death claims.159 In the state law claim of Northern Pipeline
against Marathon Pipe Line, the bankrupt party, Northern, sought
damages for alleged breaches of contract and warranty, misrepresentation, coercion, and duress.' 6 A state law based contract claim, similar
to the one held by Northern,' 6' may be designated a proceeding that
affects the liquidation of assets of the estate. An argument could be
advanced that to liquidate an estate all valuable claims held by the
estate must be settled or determined. Moreover, the claim then would
be a core proceeding' 62 and could be heard and determined by an
article I bankruptcy judge without the consent of the parties. Again,
the holding of the Supreme Court in Marathon would be violated. "3
Under either the counterclaim or the liquidation of assets examples,
a party who does not wish to have the state law claim determined
by an article I judge may seek withdrawl of the claim from the
bankruptcy court to the district court.' 6 If the resolution of a claim
does not require consideration of laws regulating organizations or ac6
tivities affecting interstate commerce, withdrawal is permissive.' 1 If
a district court refuses to withdraw the state law claim, the article
I bankruptcy judge would hear and determine the claim. This
Marathon violation threatens the constitutionality of the 1984 Act.
An additional constitutional issue relating to jurisdiction by consent
of the parties to a bankruptcy proceeding will be analyzed in the
following section.
3. Jurisdiction by Consent of the Parties
The most significant potential constitutional challenge relates to adjudication by an article I bankruptcy judge based upon consent of
all parties to the claim. Under the 1984 Act, a bankruptcy judge may
158. 28 U.S.C. §157(b)(2)(0).
159.
160.
161.

Id.
See Marathon, 458 U.S. at 56.
Id. at 90 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).

162. 28 U.S.C. §157(b)(2)(0).
163. See Marathon, 458 U.S. at 90-91.
164.
165.

28 U.S.C. §157(d).
Id.
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issue final orders and judgments on a claim related to a case under
Title 11 if all the parties consent. 16 6 Adjudication by a bankruptcy
judge based upon consent of the parties is significant because a state
law claim may be heard and determined by a nonarticle III judge,
an event that, without the consent stipulation, would violate
Marathon. 67 The three dissenting justices in Marathon agreed that
any constitutional defects in the 1978 Act could be cured by consent
to adjudication of the related state law claim by an article I bankruptcy
judge. 68 Chief Justice Burger stated that, notwithstanding the plurality
opinion, the Marathon holding must be limited to the concurrence
of Justice Rehnquist. 69 Chief Justice Burger interpreted the concurrence of Justice Rehnquist to mean that the consent by the parties
would have satisfied any constitutional deficiencies. 1 " Justice Rehnquist
stated that "[n]one of the cases has gone so far as to sanction the
type of adjudication to which Marathon will be subjected against its
will under the provisions of the 1978 Act." 17' While Justice Rehnquist did intimate that consent may be a cure, 17 Chief Justice Burger's
interpretation is not the only possible interpretation. The concurrence
does not establish that a majority of justices would approve the consent theory. Justice Rehnquist's "subjected against its will" language
indicates Marathon Pipeline was being coerced. That language,
however, does not establish clearly Justice Rehnquist's adherence to
the theory that consent cures the constitutional defect. Recent decisions regarding the constitutionality of the Federal Magistrates Act
of 197917 (hereinafter the Magistrates Act) address the issue of jurisdiction by consent.' 7
The new bankruptcy judges bear a resemblance to United States
Magistrates established under the Magistrates Act. 75 The Magistrates
Act was upheld by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Pacemaker
Diagnostic Clinic of America v. Instromedix.176 The majority opinion
166. Id. §157(c)(2).
167. See Marathon, 458 U.S. at 90-91.
168. In Chief Justice Burger's characterization of the holding of the case, he said that "absent
the consent of the litigants," a traditional state common law action must be heard by an "Article III court." Marathon, 458 U.S. at 92 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); see also id. at 95 (white,
J., dissenting) (similar language indicating consent is a cure).
169. Id. at 92.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 91 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
172. Id.

173. Pub. L. No. 96-82, 93 Stat. 643 (1979).
174.
(9th Cir.
175.
176.

See, e.g., Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic, Inc. v. Instromedix, Inc., 725 F.2d 537, 547
1984) (en banc); \Vharton-Thomas v. United States, 721 F.2d 922, 929-30 (3d. Cir. 1983).
See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
725 F.2d 537 (1984).
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distinguished two components of the separation of powers
protections.' 77 One component reaches to the rights of parties; another
pertains to the relations between the separate branches of the
government. 78 Within the second portion of the separation of powers
protections, a potential compromise to the essential independence of
the judiciary exists. 1 9 Although the personal right of a federal litigant
to demand article III adjudication of a civil suit may be waived,' °
the court in Pacemaker held that the protection of the second component may not be waived.""' An integral factor in holding that the
personal right to article III adjudication is waivable is that the litigant
voluntarily must relinquish the right.' 82 If a federal litigant is coerced
or manipulated by the imposition of "serious burdens and costs" into
a court in which an article I judge sits, the right to article III adjudication would not be relinquished voluntarily. "3 The integral factor of voluntary consent to article I jurisdiction must be examined
in the context of the 1984 Act.
Dissenting in Marathon, Justice White admitted to Congressional
recognition of a lack of judicial interest in bankruptcy matters and
that this realization led to the establishment of bankruptcy courts."'
Accordingly, the district courts have adopted rules of automatic referral
for all bankruptcy and related matters to bankruptcy judges."8 5 Under
the procedural requirements of the 1984 Act, once an action of a
party is referred to a bankruptcy judge, the party may seek withdrawal
of their claim to the district court. 8 6 A party may be deterred from
seeking withdrawal due to lack of interest on the part of district court
judges for bankruptcy matters and overly crowded dockets.' 87 Practically speaking, a party will be dissuaded from refusing to consent
to bankruptcy judge adjudication of all their claims because of potential prejudice. Thus, the rationale for litigant consent to waiver in
the magistrate system is invalid if applied to bankruptcy courts.
177. Id. at 541.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 542.
181. Id. at 543-44.
182. Id. at 543.
183. Id.
184. Congress was concerned that lack of judicial interest in bankruptcy matters would
lead to a "failure by the federal courts to deal with bankruptcy matters in an expeditious
manner." Marathon, 458 U.S. at 116 (white, J., dissenting).
185. Thomas, Highlights of the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of
1984, 8 Bus. LAw NEws 3, 4 (1984).
186. 28 U.S.C. §157(d).
187. See supra note 184 and accompanying text; see also Pacemaker, 725 F.2d at 547 (in-

dicating concern over the ever mounting volume of cases in federal courts).

1985 / Bankruptcy Judges

Although magistrates handle a general docket of referred cases, '
bankruptcy judges are very specialized. 89' A litigant recognizing
bankruptcy judge specialization may not want to have a state common law claim adjudicated by a bankruptcy judge, but may experience
the coercion that concerned the Pacemaker court. For example, a party
might be dissuaded from seeking withdrawal to the district court
because of time delays and added litigation expense. In addition, the
judicial system may coerce a litigant into involuntary consent.1 9 The
dissent in Pacemaker expressed this concern regarding consensual
reference under the Magistrates Act."' The dissent questioned whether
consent truly is voluntary when the express purpose of the Magistrate
Act provisions relating to consensual reference was to encourage certain classes of litigants to give up their right to article III adjudication because overburdened district judges could not hear all cases
promptly. 192 The same concerns apply to the Bankruptcy Amendments
and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, since in both the bankruptcy and
magistrate systems withdrawal is back to the same overburdened district
court judges.
The problems raised by the consensual reference section of the 1984
Act are significant. For the most part, these problems could be
eliminated if bankruptcy judges were granted article III status.' 9 3 If
article III status were granted, the referral and withdrawal provisions
could be eliminated because the need for final adjudication by the
article III district court no longer would exist. 94 Furthermore, the
requirement of Marathon that an article III judge must hear a state
law claim would be satisfied. In light of the problems raised by the
1984 Act, this author proposes that article III status for bankruptcy
judges would result in a more fair and efficient bankruptcy system.
PROPOSAL: ARTICLE III STATUS FOR BANKRUPTCY JUDGES

Many of the goals of an efficient bankruptcy system can be attained
and many problems solved by conferring article III status on bank188. Under 28 U.S.C. §636(c), Magistrates are authorized, when specially designated by
the district court, to exercise jurisdiction over civil matters and enter final judgments in civil
cases within the district court, provided the parties consent to the district court reference.
Pacemaker, 725 F.2d at 540.
189. Marathon, 458 U.S. at 118 (White, J., dissenting).
190. See Pacemaker, 725 F.2d at 553-54 (Schroeder, C.J., dissenting). Although this concern is expressed with respect to the magistrate system, the coercion, which may develop in
the bankruptcy court system under the 1984 Act, is analogous.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. See infra note 197 and accompanying text.
194. See infra notes 197-98 and accompanying text.
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ruptcy judges.' 9 Initially, a determination must be made that federal
court jurisdiction may exist over a state law claim related to a
bankruptcy case.' 96 This threshold issue is a prerequisite for the broad
jurisdiction necessary for efficient handling of bankruptcy matters.
If no federal court may hear a state law claim related to a bankruptcy
proceeding, delays would arise in the final settlement of a bankrupt
estate. Severance of the state law claim from the bankruptcy case
would conflict with the goal of providing a single court for all proceedings related to a bankruptcy case. Although this concern is not
solved by granting bankruptcy judges article III status, federal courts
may have jurisdiction over state law claims by extending the doctrine
of pendent jurisdiction or use of summary jurisdiction.' 97 Other constitutional issues can be solved by establishing article III bankruptcy
judgeships.
The constitutional concern that a related state law claim might be
designated a core proceeding and adjudicated by an article I bankruptcy
judge would be solved by granting article III status. Article III
bankruptcy judges would have the broad jurisdictional powers of
district court judges. Therefore, the Marathon prohibition against adjudication of state law claims by an article I judge would be satisfied.
Moreover, state law core proceedings no longer would be subject to
constitutional attack. In addition, bankruptcy judges with article III
protections could work independently of the district court and the
control provisions of the 1984 Act could be eliminated.' 98 This independence was sought by Congress for bankruptcy judges under the
1978 Act that was held invalid in Marathon.'99 Finally, neither the
referral and withdrawal sections of the 1984 Act, nor reluctance of
the district courts to hear bankruptcy matters, work against a litigant
seeking adjudication of a state law claim related to a bankruptcy case
by an article III court. Consensual reference would be unnecessary
since the bankruptcy judges would be sitting in article III courts.
Therefore, since many of the concerns analyzed could be solved, article III status for bankruptcy judges would provide not only a court
system free of constitutional doubts, but also a fair and efficient
bankruptcy system.

195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

King, supra note 1, at
See supra notes 94-104
See id.
See supra notes 118-33
See supra notes 48-50,

100.
and accompanying text.
and accompanying text.
86-88 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION

Prior to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, the bankruptcy system
was in great need of reform to reflect changing social and economic
conditions in this country."' 0 Congress determined that an integral
factor for this reform was the need for federal judges hearing
bankruptcy cases to possess broad jurisdictional powers.2"' An independent federal judiciary staffed with federal judges who possess the important article III protections of life tenure and salary guarantees is
as important as the need for an efficient and competent bankruptcy
system. The Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of
1984 raises a series of significant constitutional problems that may
result in much litigation 0 2 and ultimately may cause the jurisdictional
provisions of the Act to be declared unconstitutional. The bankruptcy
system might be placed back to the position experienced after the
Marathon decision. Even if the 1984 Act is upheld as constitutional,
the Act does not meet the important demands of an efficient system
for the quick and fair adjudication of bankruptcy matters. To ensure
that bankruptcy judges have the broad jurisdiction they require without
violating the letter or structure of the Constitution, bankruptcy judges
should be granted article III status.
Charles S. Custer
200. King, supra note 1, at 100.
201. Id.
202. Recent bankruptcy and district courts have addressed issues raised by the 1984 Act.
In re Charles Hamilton Lorren, 12 Bankr. Court Decisions, at Al (Jan. 24, 1985)(juridiction
of district courts includes bankruptcy judges); In re Caralee Jean Pierce, 12 Bankr. Court Decisions, at A2 (Jan. 24, 1985) (no bankruptcy court jurisdiction over breach of lease dispute);
In re Shearn Moody, Jr., No. M-84-90, 12 Bankr. Court Decisions, at Al (Feb 7, 1985) (constitutionality of 1984 Act upheld); In re Associated Grocers of Nebraska Co-op, 12 Bankr.
Court Decisions, at Al (Feb. 21, 1985) (section 157(b)(2)(F) held unconstitutional).
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